Special Analysis: A Ceasefire Window, But Not Yet an Open Door (Featured in BBC, Reuters, and others)
The special analysis, “A Ceasefire Window, But Not Yet an Open Door,” builds on my earlier work for Reuters and was further developed for a live interview on BBC Business Today (07:30, 9 April 2026, Dubai time). During the BBC interview, I placed particular emphasis on the implications for the global fertilizer market, which I believe added a meaningful and differentiated perspective to the broader discussion.
Unlike my usual post-interview reflections, the BBC News interview offered a rare moment. I was able to watch the live broadcast on TV while speaking, which made for an interesting and slightly surreal experience.
Beyond that, the conversation with BBC was a valuable opportunity to share my perspective on the de facto closure of the Strait of Hormuz and its implications for both the shipping and fertilizer markets.
Being based in Dubai gives me a front-row view of how the situation is unfolding. I’ve made it a priority to follow developments closely and provide timely, relevant analysis to the industry.
The opportunity to contribute to recent discussions on BBC and CNBC has been both humbling and energizing. It’s also a reminder that consistent focus and commitment to your area of expertise do get recognized. I’m grateful for the opportunity and even more motivated to continue contributing.
Daejin Lee from Dubai. 9 April 2026. 
Special Analysis: A Ceasefire Window, But Not Yet an Open Door (Featured in BBC, Reuters, and others)
✦The two-week ceasefire between the United States and Iran, announced on April 8, 2026, has brought a moment of collective relief after nearly six weeks of the most severe maritime disruption since World War II. The shipping industry is responding with cautious relief rather than celebration — and "fragile" is exactly the right word. Those of us tracking AIS data since February 28 are focused on physical signals — actual transit counts — not the language of diplomacy.
The two sides are not describing the same reality. President Donald Trump spoke of a "complete, immediate, and safe opening" of the strait, while Iran's Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi stated that passage would be "possible via coordination with Iran's Armed Forces and with due consideration of technical limitations." Those are fundamentally different positions, and the gap between them is precisely what the market is watching.
A 14-day window is simply too short to restore the level of confidence needed to fully unwind the embedded uncertainty premium — particularly for Arabian Gulf loading routes.
— Daejin Lee, as quoted by Reuters and Independent
✦ The Trend Was Already Moving Before the Ceasefire
AIS momentum had been building for weeks before the announcement. Trapped oceangoing vessels in the Arabian Gulf declined steadily from 1,135 on April 1 to 1,103 on April 8 — a sustained net outbound flow already underway, with eastbound transits recovering to 10–15 per day.
One of the more telling signals has been the use of the AIS destination field as a political message rather than a navigational one. Vessels have been broadcasting "INDIA SHIP INDIA CREW", "CHINA OWNER CREWS", "RUSSIAN FLAG CREW", alongside destination declarations like "BASRAH" and "FOOD FOR IRAN" — all directed at IRGC patrol vessels, effectively communicating: we are not your target..
✦ What the Ceasefire Changes — and What It Does Not
Iran's language falls well short of the "complete, immediate, and safe opening" that President Trump demanded. It preserves the IRGC coordination requirement and introduces "technical limitations" — undefined language that can control the pace and selectivity of access. Maersk confirmed no changes to its services; Hapag-Lloyd's CEO indicated a return to normal operations would take at least six to eight weeks. These reflect operators who have seen too many false dawns to move ahead of the insurance market.
The war-risk insurance framework effectively collapsed in early March, and rebuilding it is not a diplomatic exercise. Underwriters will require several consecutive days of incident-free transits before considering any meaningful premium reduction. Until then, transit economics remain prohibitive for mainstream commercial vessels, regardless of political messaging.
Some vessels have used an alternative southern corridor hugging the Omani coastline — the tankers Dhalkut and Habrut, and the LNG carrier Sohar LNG on April 2. This corridor lies outside Iran's legal authority to toll. Whether it remains accessible under ceasefire terms is a key operational question.
✦ The IRGC Toll System at Larak Island
Multiple reports suggest the IRGC has been operating an informal toll system at the Larak Island corridor — the narrow passage between Qeshm and Larak islands that has become the de facto route for approved vessels.
Operators submit full vessel documentation via IRGC-linked intermediaries — IMO number, cargo manifest, crew nationalities, and ownership details. Once vetted, a permit code is issued and broadcast via VHF radio upon approach. For oil tankers, the fee is reportedly around $1 per barrel — roughly $2 million per transit for a VLCC carrying ~2 million barrels. The payment mechanism remains unclear, with crypto or alternative currencies cited given sanctions compliance constraints.
✦ Traffic Will Pick Up Gradually, Not Suddenly
Pre-conflict traffic averaged 120–140 vessels per day. Over 1,000 oceangoing vessels (3,000+ including regional tonnage) remain trapped. Even under fully open conditions, clearing the backlog within two weeks would be unrealistic. The Larak Island corridor has been processing an estimated 15–20 transits per day at peak capacity — far below what would be required. Blue-chip shipowners waiting several days to confirm the ceasefire holds is rational risk management, not overcaution.
✦Freight Rates Will Soften, But Structural Support Remains
Markets have already reacted. Brent crude fell sharply below $100/bbl following the ceasefire, though it remains well above the pre-war range of ~$60–70/bbl. Tanker freight rates are expected to ease from recent peaks, while lower bunker costs will also weigh on voyage economics. But the key variable is not diplomatic sentiment — it is war risk insurance. Insurers will likely require several days of incident-free transits before recalibrating risk models, and the two-week window may be insufficient to restore confidence at scale.
✦Who Gets Through First: Access Hierarchy
Established: China, India, Russia, Pakistan, Oman, Iraq = Scale up quickly; bilateral arrangements tested since mid-March
Conditional: Malaysia, Thailand, Turkey, Egypt, France, Greece = Case-by-case access; managed openings per AIS patterns
Uncertain: US/Israeli-linked ownership or port call history = Eligibility constraints remain under ceasefire terms
Singapore's Foreign Minister stated on April 7 that Singapore will not negotiate with Iran for safe passage as a matter of principle. Should Iran impose transit fees, some countries may refuse to comply and seek alternative routes — even at the cost of longer transit times. A reasonable working estimate is that approximately half of the trapped vessels could clear transit within the two-week window.
✦ The Fertilizer Market Dimension
The Strait of Hormuz is a critical artery for global fertilizer supply chains. Approximately 30–35% of global seaborne fertilizer trade, a significant share of nitrogen fertilizers (urea and ammonia), and 44–50% of sulfur — essential for phosphate fertilizer production — are produced and exported from the Gulf region through this strait.
Since fertilizer production relies on crude oil and natural gas as core energy inputs, the estimated 7 to 9 million barrels per day shut-in by Gulf producers during March and April directly constrains fertilizer output and cargo volumes. Production normalization is expected to take at least three to four months — making supply disruptions and price spikes across nitrogen, phosphate, and sulfur fertilizers unavoidable.
The hardest-hit regions will be South America (Brazil, Argentina) and Asia (India, China, Southeast Asia), which are heavily dependent on Middle Eastern imports — with knock-on effects likely for soybean, corn, rice, and wheat production. North America (US, Canada) has relatively higher self-sufficiency, but surging global prices will sharply squeeze farm profitability, likely leading to reduced planting areas and production shortfalls.
The paralysis of the Strait of Hormuz is not merely a logistics crisis — it is shaking the entire energy-fertilizer production system of the Middle East and emerging as a key factor disrupting global grain supply chains. The cascading shock runs from fertilizers → grains → food security, threatening the entire global supply chain.
⚑ 72-Hour Watchpoints
- Whether the first non-Iranian commercial transits post-ceasefire are completed without incident
- Whether any war-risk underwriters formally signal premium reductions
- Whether Iran issues clearer operational guidance on what "coordination" and "technical limitations" mean in practice
✦ Conclusion: A Window, Not Yet a Gateway
This ceasefire represents a genuine opportunity — and it should be used effectively. But the picture that emerges is one of cautious, conditional, and gradual reopening — not a lifting of restrictions, but a managed easing. The distinction matters enormously for shipowners, charterers, insurers, and commodity traders deciding what to do next.
An estimated 20,000 seafarers remain stranded in the region — their safety and welfare must remain the top priority in all commercial and operational decisions. The signals on the water are clear: the market is not opening, it is carefully, conditionally unwinding. Who moves, how, and how quickly remains deeply uncertain.
Daejin Lee
Please note this content has been prepared with the assistance of AI and is based on publicly available information, intended for general informational purposes only. It may contain errors or inaccuracies. Users are advised to independently verify all information, data, and figures against original sources before relying on it.Media Citations
[Reuters]
With more than 1,000 ocean-going vessels trapped within the gulf, it would likely take more than two weeks to clear the backlog even under normal conditions, said Daejin Lee, global head of research at Fertmax FZCO.
"A 14-day window is simply too short to restore the level of confidence needed to fully unwind the embedded uncertainty premium - particularly for Arabian Gulf loading routes," he said. Lee said details remained unclear, including what actions ships and charterers must take to gain passage.
"Many blue-chip shipowners may wait several days to ensure the ceasefire holds before committing vessels," he said
https://english.kyodonews.net/articles/-/73906
https://www.cbc.ca/news/world/war-ceasefire-strait-hormuz-outlook-9.7155950
https://enterpriseam.com/ksa/2026/04/09/can-the-gulf-just-snap-back-its-energy-system
[Independents]
But Daejin Lee, global head of research at Fertmax FZCO, said that it would likely take more than two weeks just to clear the backlog of vessels trapped within the Gulf.
“A 14-day window is simply too short to restore the level of confidence needed to fully unwind the embedded uncertainty premium - particularly for Arabian Gulf loading routes,” he said.